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Abstract: The latest reform of the Common Agricultural Policy has just been accepted, identifying important challenges for EU agriculture but 
proposing only limited changes to the previous CAP. Now it is time for the implementation of the new measures. However, from a theoretical 
point of view, it seems that the CAP can hardly meet the challenges it faces due to the inconsistencies between the predefined challenges and 
the measures proposed to meet them. The aim of the paper is to analyse the consistency between the challenges of European agriculture and 
the policy measures aimed at meeting them. It seems that not all measures are consistent with the challenges. 
1. Introduction
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is still at a 
crossroads. On the one hand, globalisation is changing the 
role of rural communities. On the other hand, CAP reform, 
budgetary constraints and WTO negotiations affect the support 
of agricultural communities. In general, CAP reform is 
perceived in the EU as being driven by the larger Member 
States which account for the majority of agricultural production 
in the EU. Several Member States (MS) still receive a lower 
rate of direct support per hectare under Pillar 1 of the CAP 
than others. It is commonly thought that disparities in rates of 
CAP support between MS have contributed to the cessation of 
agriculture in more marginal regions of Europe with subsequent 
concentration of production in other parts of Europe where 
CAP payments are higher (Herzon, 2008).
European agriculture faces many challenges in the 21st 
century, from which the following were identified by the 
European Commission (2010): food security, environment 
and climate change and territorial balance. Three main 
objectives are derived from these challenges (2010): viable 
food production, sustainable management of natural resources 
and climate action and balanced territorial development. To 
meet these challenges seems to require a radical change in the 
CAP. However, the new reform package largely maintains the 
status quo and does not resolve the fundamental incoherence, 
illegitimacy and unsustainability of the CAP. This paper 
provides an analysis of the challenges European agriculture 
faces and we question whether the reformed measures are 
even consistent with the EC’s own objectives. 
The Communication of the European Commission published 
in 2010 identifies three key challenges for European agriculture 
(European Commission, 2010): 
Food security. As the world’s population is expected to 
grow to around nine billion by 2050, global demand for food 
will significantly increase, resulting in a measurable growth 
in world food production. Over the next 40 years, agricultural 
production will have to increase by some 60%. The traditional 
CAP objective of food security will remain in place, although 
there is an increasing acknowledgement of the need to address 
social and environmental values too. The EU should be able to 
contribute to world food demand by preserving and improving 
its agricultural production capacity while meeting the high 
safety, quality and welfare standards required by its citizens as 
well. In order to meet this challenge, the CAP has to stabilise 
incomes and markets as well as improve the international 
competitiveness of its agricultural sector and the functioning 
of the food supply chain in times of greater market uncertainty, 
increased price volatility.
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Environment and climate change. Farmers work close 
to nature and to living things but face increasing competition 
in a globalised agricultural food system. But food is more 
than just a commodity. European consumers demand healthy 
and safe food produced with respect for the environment and 
for animal welfare according to sustainable development 
criteria. The major challenge for the food system – and thus 
for farmers – is to make itself visible and recognisable to all 
European consumers for its quality, its safety, the diversity 
of its products, its capacity to adapt to changing demand and 
for being different to products that come from outside the 
EU. Furthermore, agricultural policy will need to respond to 
public demands linked to the maintenance of landscapes, the 
conservation of natural resources and biodiversity, food safety 
and sustainability. Farming practices can have beneficial (e.g. 
organic agriculture) or harmful (e.g. intensive agriculture) 
effects on the environment, while the provision of public 
goods can potentially offer several environmental benefits 
(e.g. biodiversity, climate stability, resilience to natural 
disasters, etc.). At the same time, climate change can have 
various effects on agriculture in the long run (e.g. flooding, 
drought, etc.) Therefore, the future CAP should help agriculture 
mitigate climate change through reduced greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions and various measures to increase production 
efficiency (e.g. energy efficiency, carbon sequestration, etc.). 
Territorial balance. Agriculture is still an important sector 
in the rural economy, offering job possibilities and income 
to rural residents and generating many additional economic 
activities (e.g. food processing, tourism and trade). However, 
many territorial imbalances, mainly between Old and New 
Member States, exist in the EU. The CAP should tackle these 
imbalances by improving the vitality and economic potential 
of all the rural areas inside the EU.
Three main objectives are derived from these challenges, 
according to the Communication (European Commission, 2010): 
Viable food production. In order to reach this objective, 
the future CAP should (1) contribute to farm incomes and 
limit their variability, (2) improve the competitiveness of the 
agricultural sector and enhance its value share in the food 
chain and (3) compensate for production difficulties in areas 
with specific natural constraints.
Sustainable management of natural resources and 
climate action. This objective also contains three elements: 
(1) enhancing sustainable production practices and securing 
the provision of environmental public goods, (2) encouraging 
green growth through innovation and (3) pursuing climate 
change mitigation and adaptation actions. 
Balanced territorial development. The third objective is 
also made up of three policy sub-objectives: (1) supporting rural 
employment, (2) improving the rural economy and promoting 
diversification and (3) encouraging structural diversity in 
farming systems by improving conditions for small farms 
and developing local markets.
In order to meet these challenges, various measures are 
proposed in the latest CAP reform. It is worth while analysing 
whether these proposals are consistent with the challenges. 
2. Material and Methods
This paper is based on publications addressing consistency 
between agricultural challenges and measures of CAP 2013 
reform. Data published by the European Commission were 
used in the analysis. The database of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations has also been used in 
the examination. The literature on the possible impacts of 
CAP 2013 reform is already substantial. Several reports have 
addressed the challenges of European agriculture. However, 
the consistency between agricultural challenges and measures 
have received much less attention. Furthermore, there is a lack 
of available publications related to the consistency of economic, 
environmental and social challenges and CAP measures. The 
use of individual studies is furthermore hampered by the fact 
that these studies might use different motivations to assess 
consistence between agricultural challenges and measures. In 
addition, results are potentially biased because studies might 
differ in their focus on how to meet the challenges European 
agriculture faces. 
3. Results
3.1. Consistency of economic challenges and measures
The EU should be able to contribute to world food demand 
and agriculture should therefore maintain its production capacity 
and improve it while respecting commitments in international 
trade and policy coherence for development. However, the EU 
is affluent and has the purchasing power to source supplies 
from the world market, even when world prices are high. 
Food security is thus not currently threatened in the EU. Poor 
households may still be hurt by periods of high prices but 
the best way to help them is through social welfare schemes. 
Moreover, the EU could take measures to increase its own 
production if a future need arose. In response to rising prices, 
farmers would expand cultivated areas, use more intensive 
farming methods and shift production patterns to increase 
yields. Targeted payments – for instance to preserve soil 
fertility and water resources, and maintain a critical level 
of farming activity – would be more effective than blanket 
subsidies to maintain existing levels of agricultural production 
or employment. Furthermore, money intended to reduce hunger 
and poverty abroad would be better spent by investing in 
agricultural research and infrastructure in developing countries 
rather than by giving it to European farmers.
Economic efficiency and competitiveness: This challenge 
is to be met via various measures among which probably the 
most important is the continued provision of direct payments. 
Established in 1992, and significantly changed in 2003, direct 
payments are now decoupled from production and alert to 
“green box” (non-distorting subsidy) requirements of the WTO. 
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Europe spent 70% of the CAP budget on direct payments in 
2012 (European Commission, 2013), aiming to stabilize incomes 
of farmers.  Direct payments were received by 5.4 percent of 
the EU’s population and accounted for 0.3 percent of its GDP 
(European Commission, 2013). Generally, well-functioning 
markets rather than state intervention are the best way to 
attain a demand-oriented, innovative and competitive farm 
sector. But the EU has a legitimate role to play in encouraging 
research and development in both public and private sectors, 
since the benefits of research and development are often shared 
across borders, and Member States can gain by pooling their 
research endeavours. 
The current decoupled income aid suffers from substantial 
legitimacy problems. It is still calculated formally based on 
historical production references and it establishes the various 
levels of support that existed in the past according to sectors and 
territories. Furthermore, it does not reflect the changes recorded 
in the orientations of farms after decoupling, once flexibility 
to produce is established, and this distorts the markets. And 
it also does not reflect the changes in the prices or market 
costs recorded in recent times, consequently overcompensating 
producers of cereals and oilseed (direct beneficiaries of the 
price increases of agricultural commodities), while abandoning 
livestock producers (who are suffering from an increase in 
the cost of feedstuffs). Compensation for past price cuts is 
no longer necessary. Generalised per hectare payments are 
not targeted, whatever name is given or conditions attached 
to them (Tangermann, 2011).  
Meanwhile, there is no evidence that farm households 
in industrialised OECD countries have systematically lower 
incomes than other households, so policies to support incomes 
across the whole sector are unjustified (Swinnen, 2009). 
Agricultural income per work unit is not an appropriate indicator 
of standard of living as it depends on total household income 
of the family concerned. This means that farm income support 
has to be based on overall incomes of farm households where 
income from other sources often complements agricultural 
income. Direct payments have limited potential for supporting 
farm income, which is the official motivation of the support. 
If support was eliminated, land values would fall, structural 
change speed up and incomes from other sources grow, leaving 
the total income of farm households (remaining in the sector) 
more or less unaffected (Sahrbacher et al., 2007). Besides all 
these, it is pretty hard to understand why the CAP subsidises 
farmers’ incomes in times of increasing food prices. As evident 
from Figure 1, producer prices have increased for almost all 
countries and products concerned in the European Union 
from 2004-2006 to 2011. Cereals prices have experienced the 
biggest increase, followed by meat and milk prices (Figure 
1). As price increases have reached 100% in many cases, 
direct payments contributing further to farmers’ incomes 
seem obsolete.
Figure 1: Producer price indices for selected products in the EU27 in 
2011 (2004-2006=100, %).
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Direct payments are neither equitably distributed by farm 
size, nor by geographical location (Figure 2). The 80/20 rule 
applies – approximately 80 per cent of the support goes to 
20 per cent of farmers (recipients). Small farmers, especially, 
are handicapped in many ways. Though they are eligible for 
direct payments, due to the small farm size and administrative 
procedures, most receive marginal amounts or do not even 
participate in the system. As Zahrnt (2009) and others have 
also emphasised, payment rates per hectare are also widely 
dissimilar, ranging from €500+ in Greece to €174 in Portugal. 
Furthermore, following the EU Copenhagen agreement, direct 
Figure 2: Distribution of direct payments by member state and beneficiary in 2012.
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payments were introduced at lower initial rates in the New 
Member States (NMS), which have still not reached the level of 
EU15 in Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. However, the EU10 
reached the 100 per cent payment level in 2013. Indeed, the 
NMS complemented for the transitional period of 10 years 
EU-funded direct payments with national supplements to make 
good the difference between their own payment rates and those 
of the Old (and largely richer) Member States. 
Based on these critiques, the 2013 CAP reform changed 
the former system of direct payments and introduced various 
novelties (e.g. greening, small farm scheme, internal and 
external convergence, active farmers, etc.). However, it 
seems that even the modified system of direct payments is 
not consistent with the challenge to secure food supplies. 
First, as the current system of decoupled direct support 
suggests, a farmer need not even produce to receive a fixed 
income. However, the fact that a farmer does not need to 
produce does not lead to the conclusion that he/she will not 
produce. There is no evidence that the reformed CAP will lead 
to a significant reduction in production due to the withdrawal 
of land from farming. It still needs to be kept in condition 
suitable for production which is not a cost free condition in 
the absence of agricultural activity. On the other hand, if a 
farmer does not produce agricultural commodities, it is hard 
to imagine how he or she contributes towards ensuring global 
food security. Consequently, stabilising farmers’ incomes does 
not necessarily mean guaranteeing food security. By seeking 
to stabilise all farmers’ incomes, current direct payments 
seem to focus on social and environmental issues instead of 
focusing on enhancing the competitiveness of farms.
Second, greening is also against food security – by 
introducing super-cross-compliance type measures (Matthews, 
2011), the competitiveness and profitability of farms is 
decreasing. In addititon, greening is a high-cost policy compared 
to payments directly targeting public goods. Moreover, many 
farmers treat ecological focus areas as a resurrection of set-aside 
abolished in 2008, while diversification of crops may lead to 
economies of scale being unrealised (Matthews, 2011). Even 
profit maximizing behavior is constrained to meet a minimum 
of environmental conditions. However, other elements of 
CAP reform permit measures aimed directly at enhancing 
competetiveness. Third, the maintenance of coupled subsidies 
might help achievefood security in specific regions, though 
the magnitude of its impact is doubtful. Fourth, specific 
programmes for small scale farms, on the one hand, decrease 
administrative costs of small farms, though on the other 
hand, it does not encourage creating efficient scale. Fifth, 
redistribution of direct payments helps decrease inequalities, 
though its extent is dubious as direct payments overall may 
exascerbate inequalities between farms in terms of incomes.
On the whole, it is pretty evident that problems raised above 
are partly treated by the new system of direct payments but 
not solved. The reformed policy seems to be an improvement 
on what went before. In addititon, CAP limits the scope for 
interventions that address the economic challenges facing 
European agriculture. It is an interesting question whether 
direct payments will exist even after 2020. 
Besides direct payments, according to the European 
Commission (European Commission, 2010), food security 
should be reached via the stabilization of agricultural markets. 
However, emphasis now is on a market orientation while 
maintaining market management tools that would be deployed 
in times of crisis. It is a serious concern for the future whether 
the CAP can really stabilize agricultural markets. The economic 
and food crisis of 2008 and 2011 highlighted that the issue 
of food security, which seemed to have been already solved 
since the 1970s, is now back to the policy agenda. Extreme 
price volatility, experienced in global markets since 2008, 
has serious consequences for the stabilisation of agricultural 
markets. Furthermore, it seems that food prices will remain 
at a generally higher level in the future. 
In addition to the stabilization of farm incomes, the 
European Commission seeks to increase the competitiveness 
of European agriculture, thereby meeting the challenge of 
global food security. However, its policy lacks coherence. 
First of all, the enhancement of competitiveness pertains to 
the second pillar of the CAP, though some elements (market 
stabilization, direct payments, etc.) will remain in the first 
pillar. It is a question, therefore, as to whether measures in 
the two pillars collectively target this issue.  
Enhancing competitiveness has implications for trade 
policy. EU agriculture as a whole is required to compete in 
the world market, and trade policy determines the way it does 
so. In order to enhance the competitiveness of its farmers, 
the EU has many trade policy tools, from increasing import 
tariffs to banning imports of specific agricultural products 
coming from outside the Community, but only a limited use 
of these mechanisms is respected by the WTO. However, 
competitiveness can also be strengthened by further reform 
in case EU tariffs remain in place as they are unlikely to 
disappear anytime soon. 
One option for increasing farm profitability in the short-term 
is to further increase subsidies to farmers, thereby reducing 
their already high costs of production. However, in the long-
run this is likely to damage competitiveness as subsidies 
artificially shield farmers from healthy competition hindering 
the evolution of a more modern, more efficient agriculture. 
Direct payments may allow farmers to withstand international 
competition. However, such “artificial” competitiveness keeps 
agriculture dependent on government payments.
Increasing European food safety standards are also against 
the competitiveness of EU agriculture. Cross-compliance, 
greening requirements as well as plant and animal welfare 
measures imply additional costs for European farmers compared 
to their third country counterparts. Therefore, it is dubious how 
the CAP, based on high standards, will increase competitiveness 
in the long run as Europe faces increasing competition in the 
globalised agricultural and food system. However, imported 
foods have to meet the EU’s food safety standards, and in 
that regard face the same costs. Surely the logical response 
is to ensure competitors meet these standards and therefore 
it is legimimate to use the CAP, in combination with the 
instruments and institutions to achieve a level playing field. 
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Furthermore, food is more than just a commodity. European 
consumers demand healthy and safe food and thus a major 
challenge for European farmers is to make their products 
visible and recognisable to all European consumers for their 
quality, safety and diversity and thereby making them different 
to products coming from outside the EU. 
Moreover, genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
issues are also on the table when talking about agricultural 
competitiveness in Europe. Do GMOs have a European future, 
or will they continue to be marginalized by many European 
consumers and governments? And if so, will this be accepted 
by the EU’s major trading partners, or will it lead to trade 
conflict and new disputes in the World Trade Organization? 
As the share of genetically modified products is increasing in 
world trade, agricultural competitiveness is largely determined 
by the decision on their use. 
Successive reforms of the CAP since the 1980s have 
introduced a more market oriented focus and the results have 
led to an improvement in underlying equilibrium between 
supply and demand.  The CAP sets no target for production 
and simply recognizes that the EU should be able to contribute 
to world food demand.The CAP is far from perfect but it is 
changing in a way that is more economically rationale but the 
financial burden of the CAP on EU taxpayers and consumers 
has not changed very much. 
3.2. Consistency of environmental challenges and 
measures
The rationale for rural development and environmental payments 
must also be re-examined as most of them are not sufficiently 
linked to public goods. In order to strengthen multifunctionality, 
present rural development and agri-environmental payments have 
to be linked more closely to genuinely European public goods. 
This will enhance transparency, the public legitimacy of the CAP, 
underline MS’ solidarity towards the provision of public goods 
and lower its profile in the budget review. Agriculture is more 
than about producing food, it manages the landscape. People 
in the EU not only demand good food, but that they also want 
biodiversity to be protected and they want rural areas to remain 
sustainable in every sense The EU therefore must ensure that it 
provides a future for rural areas, both economically, but also in 
terms of biodiversity and renewable natural resources. There is a 
fundamental jointness in land management between the agricultural 
(or other marketed outputs) and environmental services. So farm 
products could be the principal output and environment the by-
product, co-product or vice versa. The production of marketed and 
non-marketed goods and services has a specific relationship in their 
production, being complementary or substitutes. It is important to 
make a distinction – in a very articulated way – between public 
goods (non-excludable and non-rivaled) and externalities (effect 
outside the market mechanism affecting output or wellbeing).
The CAP is faced with numerous environmental challenges, 
including, inter alia, GHG emissions and climate change, soil 
depletion, water/air quality, habitats and biodiversity. These 
challenges are best tackled by focusing on the sustainable 
management of natural resources and climate action with three-
sub-objectives: sustainable production practices and the provision 
of environmental public goods, green growth through innovation 
and climate change mitigation and adaptation actions (European 
Commission, 2010). The long run sustainability of agriculture in 
the EU depends on maintaining the underlying natural resource 
(soil, water, air and biodiversity) base. Although farmers are 
the managers of the majority of land and water resources across 
the EU, agriculture provides a modest or even declining share 
of economic activity in most rural areas (Cunha and Swinbank, 
2011). In practice, the latest CAP reform elaborates greening 
measures, while green growth and climate change mitigation 
and adaptation actions seem to remain merely as high-sounding 
rhetoric. 
At least some environmental public goods should justify EU 
support. For example the fight against climate change, which is a 
global challenge justifying a supranational response. Monitoring 
greenhouse gas emissions in order to apply cap-and-trade schemes 
or carbon taxes is difficult in agriculture. Payments for climate-
friendly farming practices may well be needed to induce farmers 
to go beyond minimum legal requirements. The protection of 
biodiversity also warrants EU support because animals, ecosystems 
and biodiversity-threatening pollution cross borders. Similarly, 
keeping water clean and preventing water scarcity as well as floods 
is an EU concern because Europeans share rivers, lakes and seas.
In the current system, cross-compliance represents the 
compulsary basic layer of environmental requirements and 
obligations to be met in order to receive full CAP funding. 
On top of this, from 2015 onwards, the CAP introduces green 
direct payment rewarding farmers for respecting three obligatory 
agricultural practices, namely maintenance of permanent grassland, 
ecological focus areas and crop diversification. At least 30% of the 
budget of each rural development programme must be reserved 
for voluntary measures that are beneficial for the environment 
and climate change (agri-environmental- climate measures, 
organic farming, areas for natural constraints, Natura 2000 
areas, forestry measueres, and investments which are beneficial 
for the environmnet or climate. However, still greening measures 
have many deficiencies. 
First, linking direct payments to the provision of public 
goods is an “inefficient approach” as money is paid to individual 
farmers and not for the provision of public goods. Since 1992, 
direct payments have been given for many reasons but it is clear 
that the system is still based on the reference yields of 1986-1990 
(2000-2002 for the new members). Thereby it implicitly assumes 
that those receiving a high amount of direct payments (e.g. 
those had high yields in the reference period) provide numerous 
public goods, which is not the case. In marginal regions, where 
the costs of production are high, direct payments can contribute 
to maintaining biodiversity and landscape preservation (Brady 
et al., 2009), though these payments are the highest in fertile 
regions due to their origin as compensation for price cuts. As 
evident from Figure 3, there is no clear relationship between direct 
payments and NATURA 2000 areas (as a proxy for measuring 
agri-environmental status). We cannot state that those regions 
with higher environmental values receive more direct payments. 
Actually, the correlation between the two indicators is negative 
at the EU27 level (-0.29) (European Commission, 2013).
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Secondly, the Communication seems to neglect the fact that 
one of the biggest problems with the provision of environmental 
public goods in agriculture lies in the insufficiency of measurement 
methods. If we are to achieve global objectives for halting/slowing 
down biodiversity loss, it is important that we demonstrate the 
economic value of ecosystem goods and services. However, 
the value of a landscape or the value of biodiversity is hard to 
measure, and it is unclear what kind of methods the Commission 
proposes for solving this problem. Over the past decade, progress 
has been made in understanding how ecosystems provide services 
and how service provision translates into economic value. yet, it 
has proven difficult to move from general pronouncements about 
the tremendous benefits nature provides to people to credible, 
quantitative estimates of ecosystem service values. Spatially 
explicit values for services across landscapes that might inform 
land-use and management decisions are still lacking (Balmford 
et al., 2002). 
However, if we are to achieve global objectives for halting/
slowing down biodiversity loss it is important that we demonstrate 
the economic value of ecosystem goods and services. . It is 
possible to develop economic tools and to build policies which take 
proper account of the real value of biodiversity. Ecologists and 
economists can work in an interdisciplinary manner to improve 
our understanding of the way that ecosystems function and how 
this relates to the flow of benefits to mankind. However, it will 
be a political choice as to whether to use these tools and to apply 
these policies. Searches have revealed a disappointingly small 
set of attempts to measure and value these services (Constanza 
et al. 1997; United Nations, 2003; Reid, et al. 2005; Stern, 
2006; WWF, 2008, European Commission, 2008; Parker et al., 
2008). Nevertheless, the question remains: If these services are 
valued by society, why are there no markets for environmental 
services (Ribaudo et al. 2008). Once they are produced, people 
can “consume” them without paying a price. Most consumers 
are unwilling to pay for a good that they can obtain for free so 
markets cannot develop. 
Note: Direct payments are calculated per hectare (based 
on UAA data). 
Figure 3: Relatonship between direct payments and NATURA 2000 areas 
in EU27 in 2012.
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One important characteristic of most markets for 
environmental services is that government or some other 
authority plays a central role in setting them up. The reason 
is that environmental services, to varying degrees, defy 
ownership – they are public goods. One way to get around 
this is to create a good related to the environmental service 
that has private-good characteristics, as has been done for 
markets in carbon and water quality trading, and wetland 
damage mitigation. These markets would not exist without 
government programmes that require regulated business firms 
(such as industrial plants and land developers) to meet strict 
environmental standards. In essence, legally binding caps 
on emissions (water and carbon) or mandatory replacement 
of lost biodiversity (wetland damage mitigation) create the 
demand needed to support a market for environmental services 
(Ribaudo et al. 2008).
Thirdly, the CAP seems to do little to meet the EU’s overall 
objective in its Biodiversity Strategy for 2020 - to halt the loss 
of diversity and to restore degraded ecosystems. Ecological 
Focus Areas (EFAs) are limited to less than 50% of the EU 
arable area and permanent crops, grasslands or pastures do 
not need EFA. EFAs can also include land uses with doubtful 
benefits for biodiversity. In the absence of specific management 
guidelines, EFAs will likely contribute little to biodiversity. 
Cultivating three crops on large, intensively managed farms is 
unlikely to enhance biodiversity and these targets are currently 
lower than existing average crop diversity in many Member 
States. In addition, the new regulation did not do more to 
improve the cost-effectiveness of Pillar 2 schemes in terms of 
uptake and biodiversity outcomes (Pe’er et al., 2014). 
Fourthly, the provision of public goods requires significant 
institutional and administrative infastructure for the effective 
management. It is doubtful that these programmes can be well-
administered without a measurable increase in bureaucracy both 
at the EU and national level. However, such an increase would 
result in cost increases and work against the “cutting the red 
tape” principle, as indicated in European Commission (2010). 
Fifthly, the relationship between greening and current agri-
environmental programmes remains unclear. The question is 
what the greening component could potentially deliver that 
cannot yet be delivered by the existing instruments. It is unclear 
as to why the respective set of agri-environmental actions 
should be moved from the second pillar to the first pillar 
with its implications for decision making and financing. As 
the payments under the greening component will be financed 
out of the EU budget, without any national co-financing, 
member states will not feel the needMember States are likely 
to try to maiximise such payments to their farmers. So the 
choice of actions, chosen from the menu for implementation 
of the greening component, in the individual Member States 
is not primarily based on the most needed and effective agri-
environmental policy but on what promises the largest transfers 
to domestic farmers (Tangermann, 2011). 
Sixthly, it is not clear whether subsidies from the first 
pillar are more efficient than those from the second. It is well 
known the t the difference between the two pillars is that Pillar 
1 measures apply to everyone, Pillar 2 are self-selected by a 
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minority of farmers. As the principle of equivalence, developed 
by the latest CAP reform, suggests, farmers participating in 
specific agri-environmental programmes (organic production, 
Natura 2000 etc.) automatically meet greening requirements, 
implying that second pillar instruments are better serving the 
environment than first pillar ones. As a consequence of the 
CAP 2013 reform the share of first pillar funds are increasing 
at the expense of the second. Based on these problems, another 
question arises as to what effect the “greening component” 
would have on the expenditure balance between the two pillars. 
Innovation, green growth and climate change mitigation 
are also important objectives of the CAP, though the 2013 
CAP reform did not elaborate measures in this regard. We are 
not aware of the exact places and the magnitude of impacts 
of climate change, for instance, nor is it clear how the CAP 
would tackle the obvious challenges in this regard. Although 
the fifth priority of the second pillar is related to climate 
change, implementation remains opaque. 
3.3. Consistency of social challenges and measures
European society is becoming increasingly urban and people 
in rural areas are at risk of becoming social minorities with 
reduced political and electoral clout. Rural industries have to 
diversify into new areas such as green tourism and farming 
itself is now often a part-time occupation. Many farmers have 
to juggle other jobs just to make ends meet. However, many 
of those living in rural areas are responsible for managing 
the land and sustaining their most valuable natural resources, 
such as water, soil and wildlife biodiversity. They are also 
responsible for the development of renewable energy sources 
including biomass, wind and solar power. 
The objective of balanced territorial development is 
planned to be tackled by supporting rural employment, 
improving the rural economy and promoting diversification 
and encouraging structural diversity in farming systems by 
improving conditions for small farms and developing local 
markets. Measures elaborated for reaching these aims are the 
Common Strategic Framework, the new rural development 
priorities, the simplification of rural development subsidies, 
the introduction of minimum spending requirements (agri-
environment 30%, Leader (or CLLD) 5%) and the introduction 
of European Innovation Partnerships. Although these measures 
bring new concepts to European rural development policy, 
several concerns emerge regarding their effectiveness. First and 
foremost, it is still not clear what rural development is about 
in the CAP. On the basis of the former four axes, the current 
six priorities and their associated funding, rural development 
is mainly about agricultural competitiveness enhancement and 
agri-environmental support.
Increasing quality of life, creating jobs, alleviating rural 
poverty, decreasing the urban-rural income gap or developing 
rural infrastructure remain just slogans without any clear 
measures for reaching them. This argument is also strengthened 
by the fact that of the 20% of the CAP budget is spent on rural 
development, only 20% is spent on classical rural development 
– so that just 4% of the CAP budget is spent on core rural 
development issues. As Figure 4 suggests, that vast majority 
of rural development funds were spent on the first two axes 
in the EU in 2007-2013, while classical rural development 
played just a marginal role in most member states.
The exact place of rural development within the EU policy 
framework is also unclear. On the one hand, the CAP has 
recently expanded its traditional agricultural focus to a broader 
array of rural actors via Axis 3 and 4 (territorial approach, 
though many measures of the other axes (sectoral approach) 
also have a number of second order effects (e.g. enhancing 
local agricultural employment, tourism retaining people in 
rural areas). This process strengthens the retention of rural 
development policy inside the CAP together with the fear 
that cohesion policy would be more likely to focus on urban 
centres rather than rural areas. On the other hand, there are 
also strong grounds for arguing that rural development should 
be reallocated into Cohesion Funds. One of the strongest 
arguments, put forth by DG Regio, is that such a shift would 
bring increased coherence in rural development at the EU 
level.  Given the birth of the Common Strategic Framwork, 
it seems that rural development will still be funded as part 
of the CAP, though the effectiveness of rural development 
programs is a key question for the future. 
Figure 4: Relative importance of the 3 thematic axes by Member State 
(2007-2013).
 
Source: European Commission, 2013, pp. 303.
4. Discussion
Regarding the future of the CAP, several general dilemmas 
emerge, having impacts on economic, environmental and 
social measures. First of all, it is questionable to what extent 
national agricultural policies will increase their role inside the 
CAP. Several signs of the latest reform indicate that Member 
States get more freedom in the implementation of the CAP 
(distribution of the different components of direct payments, 
defining national rural development priorities, etc.) This is an 
important issue as different national implementations might 
alter the overall consistency between challenges and measures.
The second dilemma is raised in connection with the structure 
of the two pillars. Although the first pillar has traditionally 
dealt with agricultural markets (and direct payments later) 
and the second with rural development, many measures are 
questioning this divison of tasks (e.g. greening in the first 
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pillar, payments for young farmers and LFA from both pillars, 
competitiveness enhancement from the second pillar, etc.). 
A consistent CAP would require a clear division of work. 
Maintaining two pillars, one requiring co-financing and the 
other not, will also maintain the bias against rural development 
payments, which need to be matched with domestic funds. 
Last but not least, it is still questionable whether the “one 
size fits all”’ approach is working for the CAP. Can we apply 
the same policy for different regions? The current CAP has 
been planned for meeting the needs of the founders and Old 
Member States, though needs of the new members are hardly 
touched upon (Gorton et al., 2009). This issue might also alter 
the CAP’s capacity to meet the challenges European agriculture 
faces, especially considering possible new accession rounds.
Based on the arguments above, it seems that European 
agriculture will hardly meet the challenges it faces as there 
exists just a partial consistence between agricultural challenges 
and measures. It is doubtful how the CAP meet the challenges 
it faces. The EU needs an agricultural policy, but it needs 
one that focuses on areas where European action creates the 
greatest value. The first pillar should be phased out, and new 
schemes designed in which aids are granted not on past, but on 
future behaviour. Under the second pillar only those policies 
that promote genuine European public goods, are efficiently 
targeted at their objectives, and avoid excessive payments, 
should be retained.
We believe that fundamental challenges are needed in the 
future, addressing the key challenges as follows:
Phase out the system of direct payments. Direct payments 
are not effective in making European agriculture more food 
secure nor are they capable of making efficient contributions to 
the provision of public goods. Better targeted policy instruments 
are needed to make European agriculture food secure and 
competitive. Innovation based on research and development, 
education and training, advisory services and appropriate 
institutions serving agriculture are the major means of raising 
productivity, thus enhancing competitiveness. From the food 
security side, there is no need to make direct payments in 
order to stimulate extra production in Europe. In response to 
the challenge of global food security, more food production in 
Europe cannot make a contribution to that goal as it would make 
it more difficult for developing country agriculture to create 
income and employment opportunities (Tangermann, 2011). 
Europe has to concentrate on competitiveness and productivity.
Invest in climate smart agriculture. Greening, as we 
suggest, is not an efficient policy instrument in meeting the 
environmental challenges European agriculture faces. The 
future CAP should focus on adapting European agriculture 
to climate change by heavily investing in research and 
technology. Conducting research and developing tools for 
quantifying environmental impacts of farming practices is of 
great importance as well. A proper monitoring and evalutation 
system should be created for measuring environmental impacts 
on the farm level and giving feedbacks to policy makers on 
the efficiency of environmental instruments.
Create a real rural development policy. The future CAP 
should clean rural development policy by focusing solely on 
classical issues of rural development like poverty reduction, 
job creation and investment in rural infrastructures with the 
overall aim of increasing rural quality of life. It is a reasonable 
objective for a common policy for agriculture to contribute to 
reduction of poverty and cohesion. 
Build the CAP on one pillar. All challenges should 
be associated with a single pillar, thus creating a food, an 
environmental sustainability and a territorial balance pillar. 
Such a system would be more transparent and better focused 
as well as it would create a better division of consistency and 
challenges. 
5. Conclusion 
The latest reform of the Common Agricultural Policy has 
just been accepted, identifying important challenges for EU 
agriculture but proposing only limited changes to existing 
policy. Now it is time for the implementation of new measures. 
However, from a theoretical point of view, it seems that 
the CAP can hardly meet the challenges it faces due to the 
lack of consistency between economic, environmental and 
social challenges, and CAP measures proposed to meet them. 
Economic, environmental and social challenges, identified 
by the European Commission, do not seem to align with the 
measures proposed to meet them. Therefore it is questionable 
how European agriculture will meet the challenges it faces 
in the future. However, Horizon 2020, the biggest EU 
Research and Innovation programme with nearly €80 billion 
of funding available for the period of 2014-2020 may contribute 
substantially to innovation making it easier for the public and 
private sectors to work together in delivering innovation. 
Reconciling production with the sustainable management of 
land and other natural resources is the major challenge for 
agriculture. Research and innovation are crucial to support the 
move towards more sustainable primary production taking into 
consideration economic, social and environmental objectives. 
Research and demonstration activities are supposed to encourage 
cooperation across basic and applied research disciplines, as 
well as between researchers, practitioners, businesses and other 
stakeholders. The expected results in relation to CAP should 
benefit a diverse primary production sector and ensure that 
high quality products and services continue to be delivered 
in sustainable ways. 
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